Tuesday, October 7, 2008, Shawwal 7, 1429    

Tribal Areas cauldron

Khalid Khokhar

America’s inability to contain violence in Afghanistan that claimed a growing number of NATO and ISAF casualties, found an easy scapegoat in the shape of Pakistan’s so-called half-hearted efforts against Al-Qaeda. It has forced US military commanders to adopt a more aggressive strategy by including “militant sanctuaries” of tribal areas of Pakistan in the ambit of NATO mandate. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, disclosed in a congressional hearing this year that “Until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from which they operate, the enemy will only keep coming”.

Washington has repeatedly accused the Pakistani military of failing to suppress Islamist militants and alleged that Pakistani Military Intelligence is actively supporting anti-US operations inside Afghanistan. The series of 14 missile strikes from unmanned drones have targeted hundreds of innocent people in the tribal belt. A ground assault on Sept. 3, 2008 by helicopter-borne US commandos, evoked an unusually strong reaction in Pakistan that alarmed the US administration which was willing to take immediate steps to deescalate the situation. There would be no compromise on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. In order to dilute the stern reaction, Mullen “reiterated the U.S. commitment to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and to develop further U.S.-Pakistani cooperation and coordination on these critical issues that challenge the security and well-being of the people of both countries.” Admitting that unilateral action in Pakistani territory is not a viable solution, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte has said co-operative efforts by the anti-terrorism partners provide the best way forward. Pakistan is facing an unstable mix of intrigue, economic crisis, simmering insurgency and deepening mistrust that could destroy its fledgling democracy and could destabilize the country, if things went really wrong. The intensification of US strikes inside Pakistan threatens to further destabilise the country. France issued a statement warning that US strikes were generating hostility inside Pakistan and undermining NATO operations inside Afghanistan. The British PM Gordon Brown voiced opposition to the US strikes against militants in Pakistan during President Zardari’s recent visit to London.

The main objective of US is to “prevent more attacks on the American people”. The US think that these sanctuaries can become strongholds and the entire geographic space could drift into al Qaeda control. In assessing capabilities, many believe that US counter efforts have weakened al Qaeda’s central leadership structure and capabilities to the point where al Qaeda can not coordinate attack of 9/11 magnitude. The question arises, is it worth the ghost hunt US have been on since September 11? There has not been a credible sighting of Osama bin Laden since he escaped from Tora Bora in October 2001. As for al-Qaeda, there are few signs it’s even still alive, other than a dispersed leadership taking refuge with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda couldn’t even manage to post a statement on the Internet marking September 11, let alone set off a bomb. How come people in the remotest area of the world can pose a meaningful threat to Americans living thousands of miles away from the boiling pot? The under-privileged and down-trodden militants have no global agenda to threaten western security. Military and independent analysts estimate between 150 and 500 hard-core al Qaeda foreigners, especially Uzbeks, Chechens, Arabs and Afghans, who are operating in the tribal area, therefore the magnitude of threat is self-conceited and unrealistic.

One of the negative fallout of the war on terror has been a growing trust deficit between Washington and Islamabad. It is manifested in American belief that Pakistan is not doing its utmost against the insurgents. Mistrust is evident in continued accusations against Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI) for what US officials call “double-handed dealing” and outright support of the Taliban. There has been a significant shift in the US military’s strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan in dealing with counter-terror measures in the FATA as, contrary to the past practice, they have stopped informing Pakistan or its security establishment of any military strikes on suspected Al Qaeda or Taliban targets in the region. While U.S. distrust over ISI and Pakistan motives in FATA will take time to repair, Pakistan should create integrated and joint operations centers at ISI or Army GHQ with US military, State Department, law enforcement and intelligence officers in residence to take on the insurgency politically, economically and militarily. This also includes equipping and training Pakistani forces with advanced equipment needed to defeat the insurgency. Terrorism is a political phenomenon. Consequently, until the political problems that give rise to contemporary global terrorism are resolved, the struggle against it will not be successful. Apart from losing 10,267 lives in the Global War on Terror during the previous five years (as per a survey published in The News on Sept. 23), Pakistan is facing plethora of allied problems. Inflation is running rampant at about 30 percent. The balance of payments deficit has soared to $20 billion and will clean out Pakistani reserves this fall, if loans cannot be arranged. Energy crisis and upsurge in commodity prices have left deep marks on the living standard of average Pakistani. The America needs to work on these lines.

Defeating these terrorists and extremists is also Pakistan’s responsibility because every nation has an obligation to govern its own territory and make certain that it does not become a safe haven for terror. This is Pakistan’s war. As the U.S. National Security Strategy indicated, the United States cannot win the war on terrorism by military power alone, it needs to win the war of ideas. To win the fight against terrorism an alternative strategy is needed. The threat might focus on such policy objectives as addressing regional conflicts, promoting democracy in the tribal areas, cooperating with tribal elders to prevent terrorism financing and terrorist infiltration, and improving public diplomacy through “peace initiatives” with the tribal elders in FATA.

All of the above challenges can be met but only with the help of allies. The United States will need to work hard to gain back the support and trust of their closest ally – Pakistan. Needless to say, future use of the strategy will require the rebuilding and shoring up of the building blocks of international cooperation in an effort to take tribal areas out of the boiling cauldron.